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This paper compares the innovation performance of established pharmaceutical firms with 
biotech companies, controlling for differences in the scale and scope of research.  We develop a 
structural model estimated with data on over 3,000 drug R&D projects in preclinical and clinical 
trials in the US from 1980-94, and followed till 2005.  Key to our approach is careful attention to 
the issue of selection.  Firms choose which compounds to advance into clinical trials. This choice 
depends not only on the technical promise of the compound, but also on commercial 
considerations such as the expected profitability of the market or concerns about product 
cannibalization. After controlling for selection, we find that: a) even after controlling for scale 
and scope in research, established pharmaceutical firms have superior innovation performance 
than newly entered biotech firms; b) older biotech firms are more similar to the established firms 
both in terms of selection behavior and innovation performance; c) compounds licensed by 
pharmaceutical firms are as likely to succeed as internal developed projects of the licensor, which 
is inconsistent with the “lemons” hypothesis in technology markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
Understanding the determinants of the innovative performance of firms is central to innovation and 
entrepreneurship research.  Yet, the development of innovations by firms is not just a matter of technical 
ability.  Incentives matter as well.  A classical example is Arrow (1962), whereby larger firms have lower 
incentives to innovate, for fear of cannibalizing existing products.  Similarly, if a firm faces a larger 
potential market or has established downstream commercialization capabilities, it will have higher 
innovation incentives. Therefore, in studying the drivers of innovation performance, it is important to 
distinguish between incentives and capability, as one may confound lack of incentives with lower 
technical capabilities or vice versa. 
A key contribution of this paper is to develop and estimate a structural model that distinguishes 
between these two dimensions.  We use data on more than 3,000 drug R&D projects initiated between 
1980 and 1994, and followed till 2005. The pharmaceutical industry is ideal for our analysis because the 
drug innovation process follows well defined steps.1  New compounds are generated in the laboratory 
(initial discovery), tested on animals (pre-clinical research), and if the firm considers them sufficiently 
promising, both technically and economically, they are advanced into clinical trials on humans.  This 
process has two important regulatory gates: At the beginning of clinical trials, when an IND 
(Investigational New Drug) application is filed, and at the end of the clinical trials, when an NDA (New 
Drug Application) may be filed.  These two main stages play an important role in our analysis. 
We argue that firms do not move all technically promising compounds to clinical trials; instead, 
economic considerations are also important in making this decision, creating differences in selection 
behavior across firms.  Thus, if one measured innovation capability by the share of pre-clinical 
compounds that eventually become new drugs, one may confound selection with capability (e.g., Shaver, 
1998).   
                                                           
1
 See e.g. http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/. See also FDA (1999) or DiMasi et al. (2003). 
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The contribution of this paper to the literature goes beyond the mere flagging of the selection 
problem and the development of a method for coping with it.  We focus on two questions that can be 
studied particularly well in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. 
The first one is the long-standing comparison between the innovation performance of large and 
small firms (e.g., Arrow 1983; Holmstrom 1989; Acs and Audretsch 1990; Henderson and Clark 1990; 
Chesbrough and Teece 1996; Levinthal and March 1993).  One view holds that small firms have more 
flexible organizations that enhance creativity and attract more inventive minds, which makes them more 
productive in R&D, whereas large firms have an advantage in commercialization.  A different view holds 
that economies of scale and scope, and learning advantages, make the larger firms better at innovation 
(e.g., Henderson and Cockburn 1996, Macher and Boerner 2006).  The comparative advantage of small 
firms may lie in exploring technologies and markets that established firms are unwilling to explore 
(Christensen 1997; Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Giarratana 2004).  We cannot directly measure 
comparative advantage. However, because R&D in the drug industry is performed by both large, 
established firms and smaller biotech firms, we can estimate whether these types differ in their ability to 
develop compounds successfully, which is our measure of innovation performance. 
Our second question is whether “markets for technology” (Arora et al., 2001) are afflicted by a 
“lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970): Are compounds offered for license of lower quality than compounds 
developed in-house?  The current evidence is mixed.  Danzon et al. (2005) find a positive effect of 
licensing on the probability of success of drug compounds, while Pisano (1997) and Guedj (2005) find 
that licensed drugs are less successful than those developed in-house.  Our paper offers a test of these two 
contending views. 
The next section reviews the main findings of the empirical literature on drug development in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and it places our contribution in context. Section 3 describes the model and 
Section 4 develops our hypotheses. Section 5 describes our data and analysis. Section 6 discusses our 
estimates.  Section 7 discusses the robustness of our results and concludes. 
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2.  Innovation in Pharmaceuticals: The Related Literature 
One group of studies on drug innovation focuses on the internal economies of the firm (economies of 
scale, scope, spillovers, experience).  Henderson and Cockburn (1996) study the determinants of research 
(drug discovery) performance, measured by the number of important drug patents.  They use data at the 
level of the individual research program from the internal records of ten major pharmaceutical firms, and 
find returns to scale at the level of both individual research programs and the research expenditures of the 
firm as a whole, as well as evidence of economies of scope.  Our paper investigates the stages after drug 
discovery, as do most of the other studies described below.  
Nerkar and Roberts (2004) examine the determinants of commercial success of new 
pharmaceutical products.  They find that proximal technological experience (patents in the same 
therapeutic class) has a positive and significant effect on the first-year sales of a new product.  Distal 
technological experience is positive and significant only when accompanied by a high level of distal 
product-market experience.  Finally, they find that the interaction between distal and proximal 
technological experience is negative, which suggests that focused and diversified innovations may be 
alternative strategies.  Nerkar (2003) also studies the relationship between experience and the probability 
that a drug receives FDA approval.  He hypothesizes that experience may not always lead to better 
performance, if the experience is of the wrong sort (e.g., oriented towards drug discovery rather than drug 
development), and if feedback is inadequate or delayed.  With drug development cycles stretching to ten 
years or more, researchers may be rewarded for discovery (measured by patenting) rather than 
commercialization (measured by FDA approval).  As a result, scientists may continue to work in areas 
that provide them with clumps of patents but do not lead to commercially useful drugs.  As we discuss 
below, even small firms may suffer from a misalignment of incentives, as reflected in their selection 
behavior. 
A second group of studies looks specifically into the drug development process by using data for 
projects in clinical trials.  Adams and Brantner (2003) and Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) analyze drugs in 
clinical trials around the world between 1989 and 2002.  They find that success rates and durations can 
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vary substantially across observable characteristics of the drugs, including primary indication, originating 
company, route of administration and chemistry.  Macher and Boerner (2006) also estimate time to 
complete clinical trials, but by contract research organizations (CRO) rather than integrated R&D projects 
in pharmaceutical firms.  They find that scale and scope economies, and experience are valuable. 
Danzon et al. (2005) focus on the role that experience (both overall experience and experience in 
a particular therapeutic category) and alliances have on the outcome of R&D projects.  Their sample is 
composed of R&D projects of over 900 firms during 1988-2000.  They too find evidence of large positive 
returns to a firm’s overall experience for the larger and more complex late-stage trials. They recognize, 
but do not explicitly model, differences across firms in the quality of their drug candidates.  
Our paper shares the approach and the goals of all these papers. However, none of these papers 
addresses explicitly the concern that firms may systematically vary in how selective they are in advancing 
compounds into clinical trials.  As is well known, clinical trials are much more expensive than pre-clinical 
trials, particularly late stage clinical trials.  Which compounds make it into clinical trials depends upon 
whether managers think the compounds are promising.  All else equal, a compound with a higher 
likelihood of successfully gaining FDA approval is more likely to get selected into clinical trials than a 
compound with a lower probability of success.   
But commercial considerations are also very important.  Acemoglu and Linn (2004) present 
evidence that larger pharmaceutical markets see more innovation.  Further, a firm with downstream 
marketing capabilities in a particular market (such as BMS in anti-cancer or Merck in cardiovascular) 
may be able to extract greater value from a drug than a firm that lacks such capabilities, and therefore be 
willing to take a chance on a compound with a lower likelihood of success.  Other considerations may 
also be important. A drug championed by a high status research team may be selected for clinical trials, 
even if it is below threshold (Nerkar 2003).  Guedj and Scharfstein (2005) point to the agency problem 
between managers and investors.  In biotech startups, managers typically have one or two compounds to 
bet upon, and therefore try to push them into clinical trials.  By contrast, larger firms have many 
compounds from which to choose, and are less likely to have a vested interest in any particular 
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compound.  As a result, biotech companies are more likely to advance products from phase I into phase II 
clinical trials, but these compounds are more likely to fail in later stages (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2005).  
In our paper, we distinguish between the pre-clinical and clinical trials, but do not separately analyze the 
progress across the various clinical stages. 
To appreciate further the contribution of our paper, it may be useful to compare it with Chandy et 
al. (2006), who examine the “conversion ability” of firms in translating drug-related patents into new 
drugs.  They find that conversion ability is greatest in firms that develop an intermediate number of drug-
related patents.  Since firms patent compounds soon after discovery, Chandy et al (2006), in essence, 
study the success rate of pre-clinical compounds.  Our analysis “unpacks” this sequence into whether the 
compound is selected into clinical trials, and if selected, whether it successfully receives FDA approval, 
and models the drivers of the underlying processes. This enables us to move away from the assumption 
implicit in Chandy et al. that firms attempt to convert every compound.  Instead, our model allows the 
stringency of selection to be driven by the expected profitability of the market, the scale and scope of the 
firm, and other technology, market, and firm characteristics, so that the rate at which pre-clinical 
compounds succeed is determined by the factors that drive innovation performance, but also by factors 
that drive selection into clinical trials.  In econometric terms, what allows us to identify selection is that 
the major resource commitments are made in clinical trials rather than pre-clinical trials (DiMasi, et al. 
2003), so that we can assume that commercial considerations affect selection, but not the outcomes once 
the compound is into clinical trials. 
Finally, the literature addresses the question of whether licensed compounds are more likely to 
succeed compared to integrated projects. The market for technology perspective (Arora et al. 2001) 
suggests that smaller technology specialist firms and established manufacturers have comparative 
advantages in different stages of the innovation process.  In particular, technology specialists are 
relatively more effective in upstream innovation activities that rely on creativity rather than downstream 
development and commercialization, which is intensive in resources and scale.  Licensing permits the 
technology specialists to “cooperate” with established incumbents downstream, increasing overall 
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efficiency.  Similarly, the network literature (e.g., Powell et al. 1996; Pammolli and Riccaboni 2004) 
posits that resources are located in networks rather than individual firms. Thus, licensed compounds, 
which exploit resources available in different organizations, can better exploit the fit between resource 
types and the specific innovation tasks.  This view, however, is agnostic that licensed compounds are 
more likely to succeed than other compounds. Rather, licensing is an efficient use of resources, increasing 
not necessarily the overall success rate, but rather lowering the cost of successfully developing a drug. 
Zeckhauser (1996), and Pisano (1997 and 2006) argue that technology markets inefficient, and 
are potentially afflicted by a “lemons” problem.  Pisano (1997) finds that in-house development is 
superior to licensed compounds, and Guedj (2005) finds that projects financed by pharmaceutical 
companies but developed by biotech firms are more likely to fail.  On the other hand, Danzon et al. (2005) 
find that compounds developed in alliances (roughly equivalent to licensed compounds) have a lower 
probability of failure in clinical trials.  However, Danzon et al. (2005) include in their sample alliances 
that were formed prior to the conclusion of each phase (up to phase III).  These alliances are likely to 
include marketing agreements that pharmaceutical firms often strike for successful compounds to enhance 
market access, implying an upward biased estimate.  We follow Guedj (2005) and only include licenses 
signed before phase I clinicals, and test whether licensed compounds differ from in-house compounds. 
However, comparing compounds discovered by biotech firms and licensed to pharmaceutical 
firms to those discovered in-house by pharmaceutical firms is not the correct way to test for a lemons 
problem.  A lemons problem would exist if biotech firms systematically licensed inferior drugs to 
pharmaceuticals and kept superior ones in-house. Thus, we estimate whether licensed compounds are 
drawn from a different distribution than those that biotech firms develop in-house. 
3.  An Econometric Model of Selection and Success 
To understand the interplay between selection and success we provide a simple model. After the 
compound has been discovered, the firm starts preclinical trials to evaluate its properties. Preclinical 
research will provide the firm with an estimate of the probability that the compound will succeed i.e., pass 
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the clinical trials and receive FDA approval.  Let Pg be the firm’s (unbiased) point estimate of the 
(uncertain) probability of success of a particular compound. We will sometimes refer to this as the quality 
of the compound. Formally, Pgij, the probability that compound i of firm j will pass clinical trials, is a 
random variable drawn from a distribution with a firm specific mean, µ j (the innovative capability of the 
firm).2 Actual success or failure is only observed for compounds selected for clinical trials. 
Selection: Dropping the subscripts for compound and firm to avoid clutter, let V indicate the expected net 
additional revenue from the sales of the compound if it is eventually marketed, and D the net additional 
clinical trial costs, which we label development costs. The firm will take the compound into clinical trials 
if it expects a net profit from its development i.e. if PgV – D > 0, or Pg > D/V. We denote D/V as Pg*, a 
threshold that is a function of V and D. Note that Pg* is not a random variable but a threshold value. The 
probability of a compound being selected depends both on the threshold, Pg*, and the “quality” of the 
compound, Pg, where the latter is itself a random variable.  Thus the average probability that a compound 
is selected depends upon Pg* and µ. 
The selection threshold, Pg*, represents the economic and strategic dimension of selection.  For 
instance, firms with full pipelines of drugs under development will assess a higher net addition to 
development costs (D) and hence have a high Pg*.  Market profitability matters as well.  To anticipate our 
empirical analysis, competition in the product market will reduce the expected value, V implying a higher 
Pg*.  Similarly, larger markets will increase V, implying a lower Pg*.  Also, public firms may have a 
lower cost of capital, implying a lower D, and hence, a lower Pg*. 
We assume that once a compound enters clinical trials, its future progress in clinical trials is 
determined only by its technical characteristics. Our interviews with industry executives suggest that over 
the course of development, the relative importance of the technical characteristics increases.  Early in 
drug development, commercial considerations such as the size of the market, the extent of competition in 
the market, and the firm’s relevant commercialization capabilities, condition the selection threshold.  As 
                                                           
2
 In the empirical analysis, µ will also differ by therapeutic area. 
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the compound progresses, more and more information about its safety and efficacy becomes available, so 
that outcomes become more deeply imbued by the technical (therapeutic) characteristics of the 
compound, namely, how effective the compound is against a particular condition and its long term side-
effects.  We simplify by assuming that both technical promise, Pg, and commercial considerations, 
represented by Pg*, determine selection. However, once selected, the FDA approval takes place with 
probability Pg.  Since we do not observe Pg, the expected probability of FDA approval is the expected 
value of Pg, conditional upon Pg being greater than Pg*.3 
Model: Let Y1 = 1 if the compound is selected for clinical trials, 0 otherwise. Therefore the probability of 
selection is Pr(Y1 = 1) = Pr(Pg > Pg*). Let Y2 = 1 if the project succeeds if selected for trial, and 0 if it 
fails in clinicals, so that Pr(Y2 = 1) = E(Pg | Pg > Pg*). To estimate the model, we assume that the log of 
the odds ratio, ln(Pg/(1-Pg)), is normally distributed with mean µ and unit variance. Further, we assume 
that µ depends linearly on a set of independent variables Z, i.e. µ = Zγ. The threshold Pg* is assumed to 
be a function of a set of independent variables X. Since Pg* must be between 0 and 1, we assume Pg* = 
exp(Xβ)/(1+exp(Xβ)) so that ln(Pg*/(1-Pg*)) = Xβ.  We maximize the following log-likelihood function:  
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Whereas the probability of success is: 
                                                           
3A different model would be to start with some projects being “good” and others “bad”, with a real valued signal, 
Pg, about whether the project is good.  Instead, here we consider each project to be like a coin toss with the 
probability of success (“heads”) equal to Pg.  The firm observes Pg and then decides whether it wants to toss the 
coin. 
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Danzon et al. (2005) effectively estimate Pr(Y2 =1 |Y1 =1).  Although they acknowledge the selection 
issue by including the share of projects selected from pre-clinicals in that indication as a regressor, they 
cannot separately identify γ and β. Nerkar (2003) and Chandy et al. (2006) estimate Pr(Y1=1 & Y2 =1) ≡ 
Pr(Y2 =1 |Y1 =1)Pr(Y1=1).  All else equal, as a firm becomes more selective (the second term decreases), 
the compounds it advances into clinicals will be more likely to succeed (the first term increases), but the 
product of the two, the share of compounds in pre-clinicals that eventually succeed, may either fall or rise.  
Without modeling both Pr(Y2 =1 |Y1 =1) and Pr(Y1=1), and without explicitly recognizing the 
interdependence between them, one cannot distinguish innovativeness (i.e., µ) across firms.  
4.  Hypothesis development 
4.1 Hypotheses about selection 
We define a firm to be more selective in a therapeutic area if Pg* is higher.  There are many factors that 
condition Pg*: Firm scale and scope, product cannibalization concerns, differences in organizational 
capability and incentives of firms, and variation in market profitability across therapeutic areas.  
We start with the classical scale and scope factors.  We distinguish between scale at the level of 
the research program and scale at the level of the firm.  Program-level economies of scale reduce 
development costs, and hence, lower Pg*.  For example, a company with long-standing arrangements 
with academic hospitals for trials in an indication will find it easier to develop another compound within 
that indication than in others.  In addition, spillovers are more extensive: the results for a given compound 
can be informative for other compounds in the same indication.  This implies a lower D and a higher V, 
and a lower Pg*.  Scale at the level of the firm has different implications. A firm engaged in more clinical 
trials may face capacity constraints.  Bringing an additional compound will imply higher incremental cost 
of development (higher D), and thus the firm will enter new compounds in clinical trials only if they are 
promising, i.e., Pg* will be higher.  Finally, scope, i.e., a wider diversification of projects across research 
areas, may increase value and reduce development costs because of spillovers across research programs, 
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as Henderson and Cockburn (1996) suggested.  This will make the firm less selective.  Formally, we state 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a. Research scale at the level of the program makes the firm less selective (lower Pg*) .   
Hypothesis 1b. Research scale at the level of the firm makes it more selective (higher Pg*) 
Hypothesis 1c. A wider scope across the firm’s research areas makes it less selective (lower Pg*). 
A well known feature of the pharmaceutical industry is that it is populated by two fundamentally 
different types of firms, the established pharmaceutical producers and the biotechnology companies.  The 
established drug firms were founded early in the 20th century, if not earlier. A large gap separates the 
entry of the pharmaceutical firms and the first biotech company, Genentech, in 1976.  Syntex, the 
youngest research based US pharmaceutical company before Genentech, was founded in 1958.  Waves of 
biotech companies have entered after Genentech.  Their main driver has been research, and the 
comparative advantages and specialization of these firms are clearly upstream compared to the drug 
manufacturers (Gambardella, 1995).  Such differences in origin, time of entry and development underlie 
profound differences between these two company types. 
For example, Arrow’s (1962) suggests that the fear of cannibalizing the profits from existing 
markets and products leads an incumbent firm to under-invest in research.  In large established firms, new 
compounds are more likely to cannibalize existing products.  By contrast, most biotech firms have no 
products on the market and have little to fear about cannibalization of existing products.  Insofar as one 
cannot fully control for this effect in the empirical analysis, the cannibalization effect is an important 
reason to distinguish between different firm types.  Difficult-to-measure differences in organizational 
capabilities are another reason to distinguish between biotech and pharmaceutical firms.  Interviews with 
managers reveal that pharmaceutical firms have well established routines and financial models for 
deciding how compounds are moved along through the various stages of pre-clinical research and clinical 
research.  By contrast, many of the smaller entrants lack such discipline, and the founders may have 
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strong biases that favor compounds being selected.  The need to provide “good news” to investors may 
also bias startups to push drugs into clinical trials (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2005).  
In addition, there may be differences in risk aversion.  Ordinarily, one might imagine that large 
established firms would be less risk averse. However, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed in a seminal 
paper, limited liability laws may make startups more risk loving, particularly in taking large risks that 
might result in bankruptcy.  The intuition is simple. A large risk (“swinging for the fences”) has high 
reward but also a high cost in terms of bankruptcy. However, with few assets to protect, and with outside 
equity investors frequently having a large share of the capital at risk if the project (and the firm) fails, 
managers of small biotech firms may be inclined to swing for the fences, which implies that they would 
have a lower Pg*.  Indeed, using patent citation analysis, Owen-Smith and Powell (2006) find that biotech 
firms in the Bay Area, which has a higher involvement of VC firms, are more likely to initiate riskier 
projects, than biotech firms in the Boston region, where universities (and NIH funding) are more heavily 
represented.  Interviews with R&D executives support the idea that biotech firms tend to push compounds 
into clinical development that firms with bigger product portfolios might hold back.  When asked, the 
managers also believe that biotech firms are more inclined to swing for the fences. 
Among the biotech firms themselves, there are distinctions to be made.  Some of the early 
founded biotech firms that survive today, such as Genentech and Amgen, have become similar to the 
established drug companies.  They have products in the market and they have to manage cannibalization.  
They have strong financial models for selecting projects, and also considerable wealth at risk from an 
expensive failure.  This suggests that the Pg* of the older biotech firms lies somewhere between that of 
established pharmaceutical firms and that of the smaller, more recent biotech entrants.4  We can then 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
                                                           
4
 Clearly, selection effects are at work here as well.  The biotech firms that entered early and have survived are more 
efficient, reinforcing the argument that they have become more similar to the established companies. 
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Hypothesis 2. Even after controlling for the scale and scope of research, established pharmaceutical 
companies are more selective (higher Pg*) than the biotech firms. The older and more established 
biotech firms are more selective than the younger biotech firms. 
4.2 Hypotheses about performance 
Below we use the expression “higher innovation performance” to mean a better distribution of the 
probability of success for compounds discovered in preclinical research, i.e., a higher µ.  
 Henderson and Cockburn (1996) identify three types of economies in research: i) economies of 
scale at the level of the research program; ii) economies of scale at the level of the firm; iii) economies of 
scope across research programs of the firm (see also Macher and Boerner 2006; Nerkar and Roberts 
2004).  There are a variety of sources of scale and scope economies.  A larger firm with a diverse research 
portfolio may have a larger chemical library (Thomke and Kuemmerle 2002); it may be more 
knowledgeable about the underlying biochemical processes; it may have better models for interpreting 
results from animal and small sample human studies; or it may be better able to modify the original 
compound to improve its efficacy and reduce its side effects. 
These benefits may be offset by organizations that are maladapted, with perverse incentives and 
inadequate feedbacks (e.g., Nerkar, 2003).  There is, however, another reason why measures of program 
level economies may appear to result in lower µ. A firm with a number of compounds in trial for the same 
indication is unlikely to commercialize all of them, even if they could all get FDA approval. Instead, it 
will pick the most promising amongst them.  Though our formal model assumes that once selected, 
compounds progress through clinical trials based entirely on technical merits, this is a simplification.  In 
reality, firms may choose to bring a number of promising compounds into trial for an indication, but pick 
only the best, terminating the rest (Dahan and Mendelson, 2001). The cannibalization effect may work 
similarly.  A firm with a product may choose not to commercialize a drug that is safe and effective but 
very similar in its target market to the existing product.  Put differently, the portfolio and cannibalization 
effects do not reduce µ.  However, they result in an estimated µ that is lower than the true µ. 
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Hypothesis 3. The innovation performance  of a firm in a given research area increases with a) the 
overall research scale of the firm; b) the span of the research across research areas (scope); c) research 
scale at the level of the program. The portfolio and cannibalization effects reduce the measured 
innovation performance.  
As with selection, there are other differences between established firms and biotech companies 
that may affect performance.  There is a substantial literature arguing that smaller research-intensive 
companies are more creative than established firms.  For example, smaller firms are said to have a more 
open environments, enhancing benefits from external knowledge (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003) and are less 
prone to asymmetric information between managers and inventors inside the organization, (Arrow, 1983; 
Holmstrom, 1989).  Conversely, internal bureaucracies inside large firms may crush good ideas.  Also, 
larger firms may tend to “rest on one’s laurels” (Christensen 1997), and they may stress exploitation 
rather than exploration (Levinthal and March 1993).   
However, an alternative hypothesis has the opposite prediction.  The agency model in Guedj and 
Scharfstein (2005), and the idea that small biotech firms may have excessive incentives for risk bearing 
imply that biotech firms would advance even inferior compounds into clinicals.  In terms of our model, 
this implies a lower estimated µ for biotech firms.  Ultimately, the net effect of these two forces is an 
empirical matter.  We then formulate two alternative hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 4:  Biotech companies have higher innovation performance than the established 
pharmaceutical firm because smaller organizations are more innovative.  
Hypothesis 4’: Biotech firms have lower innovation performance because of misaligned incentives. 
4.3 Licensing related hypotheses 
If the licensing agreement does not share costs and benefits in the same proportion across the licensee and 
licensor, this will bias the selection threshold.  In the extreme case, if the licensee is responsible for the 
cost of development but has to pay a royalty from sales of a successful compound to the licensor, this 
effectively reduces V for the licensee, implying a lower Pg*.  However, knowing this, partners try to align 
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incentives by sharing costs and benefits.  We do not observe details of the licensing contracts and 
accordingly we do not formulate a hypothesis regarding the effect of licensing on Pg*.  
Regarding the performance of licensed compounds, following Akerlof (1970), the economics 
literature predicts that markets for knowledge are characterized by information asymmetries about the 
quality of the technology offered for license (Zeckhauser, 1996).  Although these arguments are typically 
used support the contention that licensing is not the preferred mode of commercialization, they can be 
extended to performance, as Pisano (1997) does in the pharmaceutical industry context.  The notion is that 
a licensor is likely to keep its most promising technologies for its own use and only offer inferior ones for 
license.  Licensees therefore believe that compounds offered for licensing are on average worse than 
compounds not offered for license, conditional on observable characteristics. If so, the licensees must be 
offered a discount.  But then the suppliers of good compounds are less likely to offer their compounds for 
license, thereby fulfilling the belief about compounds offered for license being inferior. If so, licensed 
compounds will be drawn from an inferior distributions (lower µ) than those retained for in-house 
development. Guedj (2005) also offers an asymmetric-information based model which implies that 
licensed compounds have lower Pg* but also lower probability of success. He finds empirical support in a 
sample of projects selected for clinicals. 
There are however some countervailing arguments suggesting that the market for lemon is not an 
important problem in technology markets.  Arora and Gambardella (1994), building on the insights of 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Rosenberg (1990), argue that research capabilities also provide firms 
with the ability to evaluate external technologies.  Licensees in the drug industry are typically firms that 
perform research themselves, so that potential buyers are capable of evaluating the technical 
characteristics of the licensed compound, especially since strong patent protection in this industry 
facilitates the disclosure of the relevant information.  Furthermore, many licensing transactions are 
embedded in strategic research partnerships, involve minority investments or co-development deals, 
reducing, if not eliminating, potential information asymmetries.  Thus, the null to the hypothesis below is 
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that the innovation performance of the licensed compounds is not different from those developed 
internally.  
Hypothesis 5 (market for lemons). Licensed compounds exhibit lower innovation performance than 
internally developed compounds. 
5.  Description of the data 
Our sample is drawn from the ATA database (ATAdb), which combines proprietary datasets on the 
pharmaceutical industry.  It reports information about more than 17,000 R&D projects all over the world 
carried over since the 1980s.5  Following Danzon et al. (2005), we consider each indication for which the 
compound is being developed as a separate project.  Also, countries have different institutions and 
procedures for advancing compounds to the clinical trials, and for approving them for sales.  Even in our 
database both the selection and success rates of European trials are higher than the US, which suggests 
that the US criteria are more stringent.  To reduce this source of heterogeneity we focus on US trials.  
Since our database indicates where the preclinical research is conducted, our sample is composed of all 
the projects with preclinical research in the US (whether by US firms or not).  We classify as “selected” 
those projects that start clinical I in the US, and analogously for successful projects.6  We exclude projects 
originated by hospitals, public sector labs or universities, where selection processes may be different.  We 
reduce the censoring problem posed by the ongoing projects that are neither successes nor failures by 
including only the projects that enter the preclinical trials between 1980 and 1994.7  Our final sample is 
composed of 3,311 projects.8 
                                                           
5
 The names of the firms in the database are reported as they are in 2002.  Therefore we cannot consider separately 
the projects of the major pharmaceutical firms that merged or were acquired during the 1990s. 
6
 There are a few cases with missing information about the location of preclinical research, which we dealt with case 
by case, by using other contextual information in the database.  
7
 Following Danzon et al. (2005), we classify as failure a project that remains in a phase, without any further 
reported events, for longer than the maximum number of years observed for completion of each phase in the non-
censored sample. The maximum number of years is computed within each indication. When this is not practicable – 
due to missing observation for the indication – we consider the maximum over all the indications.  
8By selecting trials started between 1980 and 1994, the sample reduces to 8,107 observations, of which 7,247 started 
by pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. We further exclude the projects co-developed by two or more 
institutions, leaving us with 6,659 observations. By focusing only on preclinical research projects undertaken in the 
US and projects with identifiable outcomes, we end up with 3,311 observations. 
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We divide biotech firms into two types, depending upon whether they were founded before or 
after 1988, the median founding year for the biotech firms in our sample.  We also distinguish between 
the top pharmaceutical corporations worldwide (henceforth “Established Pharma”), and smaller 
pharmaceutical firms developing compounds that target predominantly infection and inflammation, 
asthma and diabetes, obesity and sexual dysfunctions (henceforth “Other Pharma”), which are typically 
much less R&D intensive.  Specifically, we distinguish among the following four types of companies: 
i) Pioneer Biotech. Firms, founded before 1988, that apply biotechnological methods to the discovery 
and development of new drugs. 
ii) Other Biotech. All other firms using biotechnology for the discovery of new drugs. 
iii) Established Pharma.  Pharmaceutical firms that are among the top 50 firms worldwide by sales for at 
least 10 years during the 15 year period 1983-1998 (excluding biotech firms and adjusting for 
mergers and missing data for 1995).  
iv) Other Pharma.  All other pharmaceutical firms. 
Table 1: Firm types and R&D projects 
Firm Type Number of Projects (%) Number of different firms 
Pioneer Biotech 1,031 (31.14%) 123 (37.39%) 
Other Biotech 556 (16.79%) 101 (30.70%) 
Established Pharma 1,512 (16.79%) 31 (9.42%) 
Other Pharma 212 (6.40%) 74 (22.49%) 
Total 3,311 (100%) 329 (100%) 
Table 1 reports information on the number and projects related to the four types of firms that we 
considered in the analysis. Our empirical measures are summarized in Table 2. Measures that vary across 
firms and indication are noted as measured at the project level, while others vary only across firms, or 
only across indications.  Table 2 also indicates the predicted sign of the variable.  Some variables are 
excluded from µ (and the corresponding cell is left blank), while other variables are used as controls (and 
the corresponding cell merely has a  mark, rather than a + or a − mark). 
Scale and Scope. We measure scale_program, or the scale at the program level by the total number of 
projects started by the firm for the given indication.  Scale_firm, or scale at the level of the firm is 
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measured by the total number of ongoing projects for the firm.  Scope is measured by Herfindahl index of 
diversification of projects across indications, for the firm.  These measures are based on the literature. 
Danzon et al. (2005) and Abrantes-Metz (2003) use the number of drugs in development to measure 
overall firm scale.  To measure program level economies, Macher and Berner (2006) use the number of 
projects completed and Danzon et al. (2005) use the total number of projects in the therapeutic area.  
Finally, Danzon et al. (2005) use the same herfindal index based measure that we use, and Macher and 
Boerner (2006) use the number of therapeutic areas in which the firm is active to measure scope 
economies.  Henderson and Cockburn (1996) use the concentration of R&D expenditures, which we 
cannot do because we lack R&D data at the program level. 
Licensed Compounds: The database records the licensor and each licensee.9  We considered a project as 
“licensed” only if the agreement was signed in pre-clinicals. 
Project Controls.  We develop a number of binary, indication level indicators10: (i) whether the disease is 
lethal or not (lethal), (ii) whether it can result in organ damage or complications (organ damage), (iii) 
whether the disease is chronic or acute (chronic), (iv) whether the disease has multiple causes or not 
(multiple causes) 11, and (v) if the disease targeted is rare or not (rare).12  These factors condition both the 
selection threshold, Pg*, and, µ, the average probability of success.   
We also use an indicator for whether the firm already has a product in the ATC2 market.  Our 
measure of scale at the level of the program is the cumulative number of past projects for that indication.  
                                                           
9
 When multiple licensees are present, we assign the development of the project to the largest US firm. We then 
inspected this assignment to make sure that we consider the firm that was actually in charge of the R&D 
development of the project. 
10
 Indication and ATC are two complementary classification systems. For instance, A02 is the ATC2 code for drugs 
for acid related disorders, where the corresponding indication may be “heartburn”.  As this suggests, ATC deals with 
the therapy, using the anatomy as the main organizing theme. Indications focus on the clinical symptoms for which 
the drug is being tested. The main source for the disease information is Braunwald et al. (2001). Other information 
comes from e-medicine reviews from the disease database (http://www.diseasedatabase.com). For diffusion data, we 
obtain information from the “rare disease database” cited by the FDA, and available at 
http://rarediseases.about.com/cs/orphandrugs/a/122103.htm. 
11Multiple causes = 1 if the etiology is multifactorial and = 0 if it is unknown or single factor. 
12An orphan or rare disease affects fewer than 200,000 individuals in the United States. The “Orphan Drug Act” 
(1983) allows drug companies to take tax deductions for about three-quarters of the cost of the clinical studies 
(FDA, 1999), with an implied reduction of cost for development.  
 18
Since we want Scale_Program to account for research scale and experience in the program we need to 
control for for the scale or experience of the firm associated with the commercialization of products in the 
same area, viz. downstream factors rather than research.13  
Table 2: Variables in the estimated equations 
Pg* µ Variable Measured as 
− 
+ Scale_Program (project) Number of projects already started by the firm for that indication  
+ + Scale_Firm (firm) Total number of projects by the firm  
− 
+ Scope (firm) Herfindahl index of firm’s projects across indications  
 
− 
Compound licensed (project) If the compound licensed in preclinical  
  Closeness to science  
(project) 
Share of projects jointly developed with a public research 
organization for that indication  
  Presence in ATC2 product 
market (project) 
= 1 if firm has a product in the ATC2 class, = 0 otherwise 
− 
 
Public (firm) =1 if firm is public when the project is started 
− 
 
Market Size (indication) Worldwide sales in the ATC2 class 
+  Market Competition  
(indication) 
1.Log of the number of firms with a product in the ATC2 class 
2. Share of established pharma witha product in the ATC2 class. 
  Disease Characteristics  
(indication) 
Lethal, organ damage, multi-causal, chronic, rare, first-in-class  
(see text) 
Finally, since pharmaceutical and biotech firms may choose projects with different levels of 
innovativeness or risk, we devise a proxy for the level of innovativeness (and therefore of risk) associated 
to the project.  We use the information whether the compound is first-in-class or a follower molecule (first 
in class).14 Other things being equal, we expect first-in-class compounds to exhibit a lower selection 
threshold.  This is because there are fewer alternatives available, and hence they have to overcome a 
lower hurdle to improve upon existing remedies.  We also expect them to be drawn from a worse 
distribution because there is less information about potential side effects.  Unfortunately, in almost 40% 
of the cases it is not possible to classify the molecule under study because of the lack of information about 
its chemical characteristics.  We create an indicator variable, First-in-class unknown, that codes for when 
this information is missing.  Through the use of these fine grained controls at the level of indication, we 
                                                           
13
 We also employ the total number of molecules in the same ATC2 with no change in result. We prefer a dummy 
indicator because the number of commercialized molecules is very skewed (average 0.7, maximum 55, 95% of the 
observations equal or smaller than to 4).   
 19
can avoid using indication fixed effects, which can bias non-linear estimates, a possibility confirmed by 
(unreported) Monte Carlo simulations. 
Economic characteristics of therapeutic area: We use information on the worldwide sales (at the 
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification at the 2nd digit level, ATC2) in the year the project is started, as a 
proxy for V.15  We measure the degree of competition by the number of firms operating in that indication 
(world wide) at the time the project is launched.  We also employ the share of established pharmaceutical 
firms as an additional control for the intensity of competition.  We use the share of projects developed 
with universities, as a measure of the firm’s links with research institutes, and its closeness to science 
(closeness to science).   
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max 
Selection 0.48 0.50 0 1 Closeness to Sc. 0.05 0.16 0 1 
Success  0.34 0.48 0 1 Public Firm 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Pioneer Biotech  0.31 0.46 0 1 Market Size 2.38 2.47 0 14.4 
Established Pharma  0.46 0.50 0 1 Log Competitors 3.09 1.02 0 5.23 
Other Biotech  0.17 0.37 0 1 Share of EC firms 0.28 0.18 0 1 
Other Pharma  0.06 0.24 0 1 First-in-class 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Scale_Project 2.67  3.53  0 31 First-in-class 
unknown 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Scale_Firm 36.23 46.19 0 586 Lethal 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Scope 0.83 0.21 0 0.98 Organ Damage 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Presence in ATC2 
Product Market 0.18 0.39 0 1 Multiple causes 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Chronic 0.79 0.40 0 1 License (preclinical 
only) 0.08 0.27 0 1 Rare 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Specification and identification of Pg* and µ.  The system of equations we estimate is non-linear.  We 
also impose three exclusion restrictions: We assume that the economic characteristics of the compound, 
i.e., the size of the market, the level of competition in the market, and whether the firm is private or 
public, only affect the selection threshold and not distribution of the probability of success.  This is how 
we identify selection (Pg*) as opposed to performance (µ).  Second, recall that we normalize the variance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14
 The information about the chemical name of the projects and its Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry 
number (when available) has been employed to distinguish me-too and second-generation molecules from first-in-
class compounds (see Reddy 2003). 
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of ln(Pg/(1-Pg)) to unity. We do allow for inter-dependence across the observations for a firm by reported 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level.  Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics.  
6.  Empirical results 
Table 4 presents simple probit estimates of the selection and success equations estimated separately.  
Compared to established pharmaceutical firms, biotech firms are less likely to take compounds into 
clinical trials (they have a lower probability of selection) and have a lower probability of success, though 
the difference is not statistically significant.  Firm scale increases the probability of success (though it 
leaves selection probability unchanged), whereas program scale decreases both selection and success 
probability, and scope reduces selection and success.  Projects for more profitable markets (larger size 
and lower competition) have higher probability of selection and success.  The presence of downstream 
assets (a product already in the market) makes selection more likely but reduces success. 
It is tempting to try to interpret these results in terms of the various theories about differences 
across firms or firm scale and scope.  However, as we discussed in developing our model, the probability 
of success will also depend upon the selection threshold, and vice versa. For instance, is scope associated 
with higher success because it is associated with lower selection probability? If so, should not program 
scale (associated with lower success probability) have been associated with greater selection probability?  
This is difficult to reconcile with a simple selection model a lá Heckman, in which the same underlying 
process drives both selection and success.  
In other words, we need to estimate the structural parameters. Table 5 reports the results obtained 
from estimating the model described in Section 3, using STATA. Note that while table 4 reports the 
drivers of the probability of selection and success, table 5 reports the drivers of the selection threshold and 
the innovative performance.  For instance, the coefficients reported under probability of selection in table 
4 are β - γ, whereas table 5 reports β. We estimate two specifications.  In one, we only use the firm type 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15
 We use 1983 figures for projects started in 1980-82 as well, because data for those years are missing. 
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dummies (Established Pharma is the reference group) and disease controls, while in the second we also 
include measures of scale and scope and firm and market controls.  
Table 4: Probit estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pr Selection Pr Success Pr Selection Pr Success 
Pioneer Biotech -0.31** (0.11) -0.22 (0.15) -0.37** (0.12) -0.08 (0.17) 
Other Biotech -0.47** (0.13) -0.79** (0.36) -0.54** (0.16) -0.63 (0.41) 
Other Pharma -0.18 (0.17) 0.53** (0.20) -0.33 (0.21) 0.78** (0.26) 
License  (precl) 0.03 (0.15) 0.14 (0.28) -0.06 (0.14) -0.02 (0.27) 
Scale_Program   -0.09** (0.02) -0.14** (0.03) 
Scale_Firm   -.1E-4 (.1E-2) 0.01** (.2E-2) 
Scope   -0.47** (0.19) 0.54* (0.32) 
Closeness to science   0.59** (0.25) .4E-2 (0.23) 
Presence in ATC2 class   0.29** (0.12) -0.3** (0.12) 
Public   0.17 (0.11) 0.04 (0.20) 
# Competitors (log)   -0.14** (0.04) -0.15** (0.07) 
% established pharma competitors   0.36 (0.22) 0.18 (0.24) 
Market Size   0.02 (0.02) 0.1** (0.02) 
Lethal 0.07 (0.09) -0.13 (0.14) -0.02 (0.09) -0.21 (0.15) 
Organ Damage -0.17** (0.08) 0.13 (0.09) -0.15* (0.08) 0.09 (0.11) 
Multiple causes -0.12 (0.08) -0.20* (0.11) -0.02 (0.08) -0.13 (0.11) 
Chronic 0.02 (0.07) -0.13 (0.15) .3E-2 (0.07) -0.04 (0.15) 
Rare -0.12 (0.15) 0.73** (0.2) -0.11 (0.14) 0.58** (0.17) 
First in class -0.36** (0.10) -0.20 (0.15) -0.35** (0.09) -0.17 (0.15) 
First in class unknown -1.47** (0.09) -1.54** (0.24) -1.39** (0.09) -1.59** (0.20) 
Constant 0.97** (0.14) 0.09 (0.21) 1.69** (0.24) -0.24 (0.42) 
Obs.  3,311 1,088 3,311 1,088 
Log-likelihood -1849.98 -616.08 -1752.67 -578.12 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered by firms). ** denotes p < 5%; * p < 10%.  
Results about selection.  We find that research scale at the program level reduces the selection threshold 
whereas research scale at the level of the firm as a whole increases the selection threshold, consistently 
with Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  Contrary to previous findings (and to hypothesis 1c), we find that scope 
makes firms more selective. Other Biotech and Other Pharma exhibit, respectively, a lower and a higher 
threshold than the Established Pharma. The high selection threshold of Other Pharma, relative to 
Established Pharma, suggests that the former have higher development costs than the latter, perhaps 
because Other Pharma lack substantial production and marketing assets. By contrast, there is little 
difference in the selection process between the Pioneer Biotech and the Established Pharma – the older 
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biotech firms have grown similar to the established firms.  However, the coefficient of the Other Biotech 
dummy is sizable (ranging from -1.25 to -1.15); even after controlling for differences in scale, scope and 
downstream assets. Younger biotech firms have lower selection thresholds, consistent with theories about 
greater risk appetites, potential agency problems, and weaker management models. This corroborates 
Hypothesis 2. 
Table 5: Structural Model, Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Pg*  Pg*  
Pioneer Biotech -0.26 (0.32) -0.56* (0.31) -0.16 (0.31) -0.55* (0.29) 
Other Biotech -1.25* (0.71) -1.72** (0.70) -1.15 (0.73) -1.71** (0.72) 
Other Pharma 1.04** (0.40) 0.86** (0.42) 1.37** (0.28) 1.02** (0.36) 
License   0.24 (0.41) 0.27 (0.45) 0.13 (0.38) 0.08 (0.42) 
Scale_Program   -0.20** (0.04) -0.29** (0.04) 
Scale_Firm   0.01** (.6E-4) 0.01** (.1E-2) 
Scope   1.11** (0.53) 0.62 (0.54) 
Closeness to science   -0.20 (0.26) 0.39 (0.30) 
Presence in ATC2 class   -0.71** (0.21) -0.42** (0.18) 
Public   -0.17 (0.11)  
Competitors (log)   0.13** (0.04)  
% establish pharma competitors   -0.30 (0.21)  
Market Size   -0.01 (0.02)  
Lethal -0.26 (0.25) -0.19 (0.24) -0.04 (0.20) -0.04 (0.21) 
Organ Damage 0.31* (0.17) 0.14 (0.17) 0.38* (0.20) 0.23 (0.18) 
Multiple causes -0.30 (0.22) -0.42** (0.18) -0.30* (0.18) -0.32** (0.15) 
Chronic -0.23 (0.27) -0.20 (0.28) 0.05 (0.23) 0.07 (0.24) 
Rare 1.34** (0.30) 1.22** (0.33) 1.06** (0.22) 0.94** (0.26) 
First in class -0.19 (0.29) -0.54* (0.28) -0.20 (0.28) -0.54** (0.26) 
First in class unknown -2.32** (0.54) -3.79** (0.58) -2.39** (0.51) -3.78** (0.54) 
Constant -1.07** (0.38) -0.10 (0.37) -2.51** (0.57) -0.82 (0.55) 
Obs.  3,311 3,311 
Log-likelihood -2467.54 -2345.18 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered by firms). ** denotes p < 5%; * p < 10%.  
As far as our controls are concerned, the number of competitors, as a measure of the profitability 
of the market, has the expected effects (increase Pg*). Similarly, previous commercial experience in the 
ATC2 class reduces Pg*, which suggests higher economic value from successful compounds because of 
existing commercialization capabilities in the area or other related learning factors. 
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Results about performance:  Table 5 shows that scale at the program level reduces µ but overall 
research scale at the firm level increases this probability. The effect of scope is positive, but imprecisely 
measured. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported.  If we believe that program (indication) level 
research economies are in fact significant and positive, then our measure is confounding economies of 
scale with the portfolio effect. Consistently, we find that if a firm has a product in the market, µ is lower, 
which is surprising if one believes that past experience should improve innovative performance. The 
alternative explanation appeals to the portfolio effect. To ensure that its downstream assets are fully 
utilized, a firm with downstream assets in a market will often have more compounds in clinical trials for 
the same indication (e.g. Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Dahan and Mendelson, 2001). However, it will 
commercialize at most one of the compounds, even if more could gain FDA approval.  The higher failure 
when there are more projects under development for the same indication may simply reflect such 
portfolio effects.  
The important results of Table 5 are that both Pioneer Biotech and Other Biotech have lower µ, 
implying that they have lower innovative performance compared to Established Pharma, and that Pioneer 
Biotechs perform better than Other Biotech, even after controlling for scale, scope and downstream 
assets. Formally, Hypothesis 4 is rejected in favor of the alternative Hypothesis 4’. There are three 
interpretations, which are not mutually exclusive. The first one is that biotech firms are in fact less 
innovative than established pharmaceutical firms. The second one is that biotech firms advance into 
clinical trials less promising compounds, because their managers have perverse incentives, or because 
they are incapable of correctly evaluating the potential of the compound, or because they are willing to 
take more risk (which may be related to their incentives, as discussed earlier).  The third interpretation is 
that the regulatory hurdles for the average biotechnology product are more difficult to meet than those for 
the average pharmaceutical product, and our controls do not adequately control for these differences. 
Our final set of results is about the licensed compounds. Recall that the lemons hypothesis is 
based on the seller systematically offering a lower quality good, keeping the superior quality good for her 
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own use.  In our framework, this implies that licensed compounds have a lower µ than compounds 
developed in-house by the licensor. Table 5 shows that we do not observe any market for lemons. 
Licensed compounds face a higher selection threshold, Pg*, as might be expected if the licensee has to 
share revenues (but not costs) with the licensor. However, they also have a higher µ, although neither 
coefficient is statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is rejected. The countervailing effects discussed 
in Section 3 appear to be strong enough to avoid any lemons problem. One implication of these results is 
that the division of innovative labor (Arora et al., 2001) in the pharmaceutical industry must rely upon 
differences in comparative (rather than absolute) advantage across biotech firms and pharmaceutical 
firms.  Alternatively, the advantage of biotech firms may lie in researching unexplored avenues, rather 
than doing better what pharmaceutical firms already do. 
7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
A key takeaway from our analysis is that in comparing the innovation performance of firms, one must pay 
careful attention to differences in behavior, and to factors, such as incentives, that may drive such 
differences. We explicitly model one aspect of behavior, namely the decision to select a compound into 
clinical trials. However, there are other aspects of our results which illustrate the same point, such as our 
finding of no program-level economies of scale, or that a firm which has past experience in the market 
(and by inference, has downstream assets), is less successful. These apparently anomalous findings can be 
reconciled by considering the incentives of firms to ensure the full utilization of downstream assets by 
selecting a number of compounds into clinical trials, at most one of which is marketed, thereby reducing 
estimated innovative performance. The problem lies with the measure of program level economies of 
scale (commonly used in the literature), which confounds the economies of scale with the portfolio effect.  
Our results imply that even after controlling for scale and scope of the firm, there are significant 
differences across different types of firms. These differences reflect both performance and behavior, most 
notably, selection. The different results in Tables 4 and 5 in the previous section suggest that explicitly 
modeling selection is important. To see this, compare the results about the firm type dummies for 
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Specification 2 in the two tables. In Table 4 the dummies for Pioneer Biotech and Other Biotech are 
negative and significant in the selection equation, but in the success equation the estimates are 
insignificant. Table 5 shows that they have significantly lower µ but also lower Pg*. Thus, we conclude 
that the reason biotech firms are less likely to advance compounds into clinical is because on average 
they have lower quality compounds compared to average pharmaceutical firms, not because biotech firms 
are more selective.  
Robustness checks:  We conduct a series of tests to explore the robustness of our results to changes in the 
sample, alternative measures of market profitability, and alternative assumptions about the distribution of 
Pg. For brevity, we summarize our results. Details are available from the authors upon request. First, our 
results are largely unchanged if we expand our sample to include projects initiated in Europe, or by 
universities and other public research organizations. Similarly, defining an established pharmaceutical 
firm to be one that appears on the list of the top 50 pharmaceutical firms by sales for three, five or ten 
years does not materially change our results.  Second, although the non-linear specification of our 
likelihood function contributes to identification, our results do not depend upon it. We also estimate a 
specification where the log-odds ratio of Pg is uniformly distributed over some subset of the unit interval, 
with little qualitative change in our results.  Finally, our results are robust to some alternative empirical 
measures.  For instance, using the herfindal index of the market shares in an indication (for the year 2001) 
to measure competition in the market leads to similar results.  Similarly, using sales at the ATC3 level in 
an indication (albeit for a single year, 2001) to measure market size does not affect our findings.16 
Exploring the implications of our results.  Since we estimate structural parameters, we can use them for 
“what-if” scenarios to provide additional insights into the implications of our estimates.  We begin by 
                                                           
16 To validate our estimation results we also compared our estimated Pg*, which corresponds to the ratio of 
development costs and expected revenues, with estimates of costs and revenues provided by the existing literature 
(DiMasi et al., 2003; OTA, 1993; and Grabowski et al., 2002).  The estimates of Pg* obtained from these 
calculations range from 0.07 to 0.19, compared to our estimated value of 0.11, which is very close to the median.  
Details of these calculations are available upon request. 
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using the estimated coefficients from specification 2 in Table 5 to compute the probability of selection, 
the unconditional probability of success, the value of Pg* and µ for the firm types in our sample.  
Table 6: Estimated selection and success probabilities, Pg*, µ, by originator type 
 Pr. Selection Pr. Success Pg* µ 
Overall 0.48 0.25 0.12 -2.87 
Pioneer Biotech 0.44 0.19 0.11 -2.97 
Established Pharma 0.57 0.27 0.13 -2.35 
Other Biotech 0.30 0.07 0.03 -4.79 
Other Pharma 0.55 0.43 0.31 -1.04 
Figures 2 and 3 show the simulated the distributions of Pg for the whole sample and by originator types, 
using our estimates from specification 2 in Table 5.  The distribution of Pg is skewed, with a low number 
of highly successful projects and a high number of projects with low probability of success.  In general, 
the right tails of the four distributions become fatter as we move from the Other Biotech to Pioneer 
Biotech, Established Pharma, and Other Pharma.  Using the estimated coefficients of specification 2 in 
Table 5 we also perform some simulation exercises.  We first study the effects of changes in firm size.   
Figure 2: Estimated distribution of Pg 
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Figure 3: Estimated distribution of Pg, by Originator type 
 
Table 7: Simulating an increase in the research scale of the firm (Scale_Firm)  
 
Pioneer Biotech Established Pharma Other Biotech Other Pharma 
 
Baseline +1 σ Baseline +1 σ Baseline +1 σ Baseline +1 σ 
Pr Selection 0.44 0.44 0.57 0.57 0.30 0.30 0.55 0.55 
Pr Success 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.38 0.39 
Pg* 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.31 
µ -2.97 -2.95 -2.35 -2.33 -4.79 -4.77 -1.04 -1.01 
Table 7 reports the estimated effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in Scale_Firm.  When 
this variable increases Pg* increases.  Since µ also increases, the probability of selection increases too.  
Interestingly, the effects of the firm research scale are rather small.  Thus, while Scale_Firm is 
statistically significant in both the selection and performance equations in Table 5, ultimately its overall 
effect is small relative to the impact of firm type.  As discussed, we believe these firm types reflect 
different organization structures and strategic behavior.  Our empirical results suggest that these 
differences are important for understanding differences in innovation performance. 
Limitations and future research:  Our results are from the pharmaceutical sector.  This sector is 
extraordinarily research intensive, and its innovation process over the last three decades has been 
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transformed, with a much greater role for genetics and molecular biology.  These transformations have 
opened up opportunity for entry.  Thus, it is a good test bed for exploring differences in innovation 
capability between incumbents and entrants.  Even so, we focus only on one part of the innovation 
process, drug development, and arguably the part most favourable to incumbents.  A fuller analysis, 
which also incorporates the more upstream research and discovery process, is left for further research. 
Another avenue for additional research has to do with differences in risk aversion. We discussed 
the impact of risk aversion on the selection process.  However, such differences may also be a source of 
unobserved heterogeneity in conditioning other outcomes. We assume that market size, measures of 
competition, the presence of downstream assets, whether the molecule is first-in-class or not, as well as 
the other disease characteristics such as lethality, chronicity, and multiplicity of causes, together control 
for differences in the potential net revenues. However, it is possible that incumbents show superior 
performance by trying to hit singles while entrants are swinging for the fences.  In economic terms, 
entrants are willing to take bets with smaller probabilities of success but much higher rewards if 
successful.  By contrast, incumbents have more financial reserves, which also makes them more cautious 
in terms of how much they are willing to bet on any particular project.  From a societal perspective, this is 
an efficient division of labor.  Society enjoys the benefits of experimentation by entrants without unduly 
risking the valuable capabilities in research, development and marketing of the established incumbents.  
Though plausible and consistent with our results, this story is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, 
which holds that even the incumbents pharmaceutical firms are focusing on blockbusters.  We leave this 
issue for further research. 
Our results on licensed compounds point to the benefits of the division of labor between entrants 
and incumbents.  From an econometric viewpoint, we treat licensing as exogenous, because estimating a 
separate licensing equation (to account for potential endogeneity) will require much more detail about 
potential licensors and licensees than we currently have.  The available evidence suggests that projects 
that are out-licensed and those that are retained in-house appear to be drawn from very similar 
distributions.  This suggests that endogeneity is unlikely but we cannot be more definitive at this stage. 
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Another extension would be to allow for interactions across projects carried out by a single firm. 
In developing our hypotheses we discussed some such interactions, most notably the portfolio effect, 
discussed earlier.  A firm with multiple projects for the same indication will likely commercialize the 
most promising and abandon others, even perhaps some that could have successfully passed clinical trials. 
In our estimation, we cluster the errors at the level of the firm, but are unable to cluster at the firm cum 
indication level.  As a result, such interactions may be captured through our measures of scale and scope, 
leading to potentially confounding results.  Future research may explicitly model how a firm chooses 
among the portfolio of compounds in clinical trials for a particular indication, and how this choice varies 
with whether it has relevant downstream assets, and with potential for product cannibalization. 
Despite these limitations, our paper makes two important contributions. It provides a simple 
model wherein firms choose which compounds to advance into clinical trials, taking into account the 
technical promise of the compound, but also economic and commercial considerations. The model also 
specifies how the observed innovation performance is conditioned by this choice.  Our second 
contribution is to analyze the factors that drive this choice, and in particular, how differences in the 
underlying innovativeness between established firms and entrants and the differences across them in the 
incentives to advance compounds in trials drive both their behavior and their innovation performance.  
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